Carrian (The Carrian Group of Companies) – a brand well-known to the people of Hong Kong – went from birth to bust in four short years between 1979 and 1983. Through corruption and deception, the senior management of the Carrian Group painted a rosy yet completely imaginary picture of their company group. It gave a short-lived but volatile stimulus to the Hong Kong stock market. The story began in 1972…
The Making of a Business Empire
In 1972, a 37-year-old Singaporean civil engineer arrived in Hong Kong to work as a project manager in a subsidiary company of a land developer. Soon the engineer was the land developer’s ‘hotshot’ and was even given the financial backing to establish a joint enterprise with the developer.
Following the stock market slump in 1973, signs of rapid recovery in the Hong Kong property market began to emerge in 1976. The engineer saw a window of opportunity and started to purchase land in the New Territories to become a major property player. Meanwhile, he set up the Carrian Pest Specialist Ltd., the first company carrying the ‘Carrian’ company brand. By the end of 1977, he established Carrian Holdings Ltd. (the so-called Carrian/Carrian Group), with himself as the group chairman (Carrian chairman), controlling other companies formed or acquired by himself, including the group’s first listed company, Carrian Investments Limited (CIL). The proliferation of Carrian businesses was then incessant, in transport, shipping, tourism, insurance, real estate, finance, catering, hotels and even entertainment. The Group also spread its businesses tentacles from Hong Kong to other parts of the world, including Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Carrian had become a multi-faceted business conglomerate controlling more than 200 subsidiary companies.
The Acquisition of Gammon House
With the Carrian empire fast expanding and its share price skyrocketing, many investors were eager to get their hands on Carrian stocks. But the single deal which really gave the Carrian chairman his legendary reputation was the 1980 acquisition of Gammon House.
In January 1980, through a company with a 75% stake, the Carrian chairman acquired the ownership of Gammon House in Central for HK$998 million. Then, after just a few months, it was announced that Gammon House had been sold to another consortium for HK$1.68 billion. The news staggered property and financial markets. News reports quoted the Carrian chairman as saying that the capital used for the acquisition came solely from the Carrian Group and a conglomerate which had long supported him behind the scenes. No bank loan was sought, he repeatedly said. At about the same time, Carrian struck another deal to purchase a listed company at HK$300 million. This company, thus renamed Carrian Investments Limited (CIL), became the Carrian Group’s first listed company. These two acquisitions not only lifted Carrian’s profile in the Hong Kong property market, but also showed off its substantial financial strength. In November 1980, the Carrian share price hit a historic high of HK$17.9 per share.
During the 1980s, the Carrian Group was involved in a string of complex criminal cases. After exhaustive investigations into offences relating to corruption and fraud, the ICAC finally succeeded in bringing the criminals to justice in a case which lasted for 17 years. This story will be uploaded in two parts. Part One will highlight the investigation and the arrest of the suspects. In Part Two, the many challenges encountered in the investigation and personal accounts of the case officers will be featured.
The Carrian case is remembered not only for its scope and complexity but the many infamous records it has set in the history books of the ICAC and Hong Kong’s judiciary.
ICAC records
Longest case | 17 years |
Longest bail period | 13 years |
The greatest number of investigators commended | HK$50 million in cash and HK$2 million in sureties |
Highest prosecution cost | HK$210 million |
Longest extradition process | 7 years |
Longest extradition process | 7 years |
Greatest number of investigators commended | 10 persons |
Dazzling numbers
Problem loans involved | HK$6.6 billion |
Exhibit documents | 4 million pages |
Witnesses interviewed | 450 persons |
Investigators involved | 44 persons |
Investigating hours logged | 102,292 hours |
Countries visited for investigation purpose | Malaysia, Singapore, UK, France, USA, Switzerland, Australia, Germany |
Rise and fall of the Carrian Group | |
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1972 | An engineer from Singapore arrives in Hong Kong to work as a project manager for a land developer. |
1977 | The engineer starts his own company to engage initially in the pest-control business and later establishes the Carrian Group. |
1978 | He purchases land in the New Territories and begins his foray into the property market; he sets up more companies to engage in a variety of businesses under the umbrella of Carrian Holdings Ltd. (Carrian Group/Carrian), with himself as the group chairman (Carrian chairman). |
1979 | The Carrian Group is expanding rapidly. Its share price skyrockets to a record high of HK$17.90 per share. |
Jan 1980 | Another Carrian subsidiary purchases Gammon House for around HK$1 billion. By October, it announces the sale of Gammon House for over HK$1.6 billion. |
Nov 1980 | The Carrian Group expands rapidly. Its share price skyrockets to a record high of HK$17.90 per share. |
Oct 1982 | The property market in Hong Kong slumps and property prices drop sharply. The Carrian Group is also hit and announces a cash-flow problem. Its share price tumbles and bank creditors apply for the company’s liqidation. |
Jan 1983 | The Stock Exchange suspends trading in Carrian shares. |
20 Sept 1983 | The Police discover that fraud was probably committed in the acquisition and sale of the Gammon House. Several prosecutions are made. However, all the accused are acquitted due to duplication of charges and insufficient evidence. |
Oct 1983 | Carrian is liquidated resulting in the biggest corporate collapse in Hong Kong. |
Carrian and Bummiputra | |
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Nov 1982 | Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad (BBMB), suspecting its Hong Kong subsidiary, Bumiputra Malaysia Finance Limited (BMFL), of having improperly approved loans, initiates an internal investigation and sends an internal auditor to Hong Kong to inspect the BMFL books. |
18 Jul 1983 | The BBMB internal auditor is murdered and his body found inside a banana grove in Tai Po of the New Territories. |
4 Jan 1984 | The Auditor-General of Malaysia, Mr Noordin, heads a three-men committee of enquiry into all BMFL-related loan payments; in late 1984, the Committee releases its interim report revealing that many loans made by BMFL were dubious. Corruption offences are alleged against several BMFL senior executives who have already resigned. |
12 Apr 1985 | Since the alleged corruption offences take place in Hong Kong, a Noordin Committee member lodges a complaint with the ICAC. |
23 May 1985 | The ICAC establishes a special task force, led by Principal Investigator A. Robey, to tackle the Carrian case. |
6 – 7 Dec 1985 | The British police arrests the former chairman and a former director of BMFL; the ICAC simultaneously arrests the former chairman and two directors of Carrian in Hong Kong. The former Carrian chairman is charged with 43 counts of conspiracy to defraud and of illegally offering advantages totalling HK$5 billion; the three accused are released on bail. |
23 Nov 1986 | On his arrest in the England, the former BMFL director agrees to return to Hong Kong to face trial. |
14 Jan 1987 | The former BMFL director pleads guilty to charges of conspiracy to defraud and accepting advantages. He is sentenced to 4 1/2 years’ imprisonment. In April 1987, the Court of Appeal increases the sentence to 10 years’ imprisonment in an appeal by the prosecution. |
Apr 1987 | The ICAC prepares for the extradition of the former BMFL chairman on 41 counts of offences including conspiracy to defraud, conspiracy to steal, acceptance of advantages, theft and false accounting etc. He lodges an appeal in England and on ten subsequent occasions applies for writs of habeas corpus to avoid being extradited to Hong Kong. |
27 Apr 1987 | A former BMFL alternate director still at large in France is arrested. Due to differences between the French and Hong Kong legal systems, he is released by the French court. |
5 Nov 1988 | The prosecution drops charges against two former directors of Carrian. |
11 Jun 1990 | The former BMFL alternate director, earlier released by the French court, is re-arrested by the French police. He lodges an appeal against his extradition to Hong Kong. |
16 Dec 1992 | Failing in his 10th attempt to apply for habeas corpus in England, the former BMFL chairman, who has fought for seven years against extradition, is escorted back to Hong Kong. |
14 Jan 1993 | The former chairmen of both Carrian and BMFL, each charged with 16 counts of bribery and conspiracy to defraud, stand trial in the High Court. |
25 Jun 1993 | The former BMFL chairman pleads guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud US$292 million and is sentenced to one year’s imprisonment. Crown Counsel describes it as one of the biggest fraud cases in history. |
2 Feb 1994 | After seven years’ effort, the ICAC succeeds in extraditing the former BMFL alternate director to Hong Kong for trial. |
28 Feb 1994 | The former Carrian chairman faces nine charges in the High Court, four of conspiracy to defraud and five of accepting advantages. The remaining 14 charges, though withdrawn, are placed on the record. The former BMFL alternate director, extradited to Hong Kong from France, is charged with two counts of conspiracy to defraud. |
14 Mar 1994 | The former BMFL alternate director pleads guilty to two charges involving a sum of US$238 million and is sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment. |
16 Jan 1996 | The pre-trial of the case against the former Carrian chairman commences. |
21 Mar 1996 | During the pre-trial, the court revokes the former Carrian chairman’s application for bail and has him remanded to await trial. |
20 Sept 1996 | The former Carrian chairman pleads guilty to two offences of conspiracy to defraud. |
27 Sept 1996 | On the day of the Mid-Autumn Festival, the former Carrian chairman is sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment. |
Carrian and Other Banks | |
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A European bank | |
5 Jun 1988 | The former Carrian chairman is arrested by the ICAC and charged with four counts of offering HK$2.37 million to a former bank manager and two counts of offering about HK$2.43 million to a former bank executive director in return for giving favours to the Carrian Group in official dealings. |
17 Jun 1988 | The former bank manager is arrested for allegedly having accepted advantages from the Carrian Group as rewards for giving favours to the Group in relation to loans totalling HK$2.5 billion |
2 May 1989 | The former bank manager is convicted on the bribery charge and is sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment. He is ordered to return the bribes to the Carrian liquidator. |
An international bank | |
Jun 1983 | A former executive director of an international bank is suspected of having accepted advantages from Carrian as a reward for facilitating short-term loans of over $350 million; he has left Hong Kong when the case is exposed. The ICAC issues a warrant for his arrest. |
8 Jun 1987 | The former international bank executive director is arrested in England. |
30 Jun 1987 | The former international bank executive director is extradited to Hong Kong. |
9 Aug 1988 | The former international bank executive director pleads guilty to two charges and is sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment. He is required to return the monetary advantages to the Carrian liquidator and pay HK$300,000 to the Government. His term of imprisonment is increased to 18 months in a subsequent judicial review. |
3 Nov 1989 | The former Carrian chairman is arrested and charged with two counts of offering advantages to the former international bank executive director as rewards for giving favours to the Carrian Group. The case is transferred to the District Court for a joint-trial with another case of a similar nature. The former Carrian chairman pleads not guilty to the charges. |
8 Jun 1992 | The case against the former Carrian chairman for offering advantages to the executives of two banks commences. |
20 Sept 1996 | The prosecution withdraws the charge of bribing bank executives against the former Carrian chairman but has the case recorded on file. |
The Unmaking of a ‘Legend’
Throughout his meteoric rise to fame, the Carrian chairman had wrapped himself in mystery. In both his personal and public incarnations, he was portrayed as a big spender. He splashed out huge sums on recruiting financial stars and professionals to act as his right-hand men, he worked in an ornate office, lived in a luxurious mansion and drove expensive cars. When caught in the limelight, he exuded immense charisma and persuasive powers. However, he generally maintained a low profile, rarely giving media interviews or granting photo-opportunities. As a result, the aura of mystery surrounding his rise to fame became even more intense. What people did perceive was the continued expansion of his businesses thanks to seemingly limitless injection of capital. At the time, many speculative reports regarding his origin and sources of finance were published, none of them conclusive.
In 1982, Sino-British talks on the future of Hong Kong began to shroud the city in uncertainty. The property market was sluggish and property prices were drifting downward. The economy suffered and the Carrian Group could not remain unaffected. In September 1982, Carrian still managed to report a profit of HK$269 million for the previous six months. Soon, however, the company announced its cash-flow problem. Instantly, its share price tumbled and Carrian’s primary bank creditors petitioned for the company to be put into liquidation. The Group tried every means and made desperate attempts to re-organise its debts but to no avail. On 3 January 1983, the doomsday of a business empire that once reigned supreme, the Stock Exchange suspended trading of Carrian stock, following which the subsidiary companies were wound up one after another.
A sluggish economy was just a catalytic factor leading to the collapse of the Carrian Group. The ‘deadliest’ blow in fact was struck by the Carrian chairman’s own corrupt and fraudulent conduct in generating capital for himself and creating a fictitious profit bubble.
The truth was that Carrian was already deep in debt and the sale of Gammon House was in fact never actually completed. The profits claimed to have accrued from the deal were never actually accounted for. As the then ICAC Chief Investigator Danny Lo King-wing put it, the Carrian Group’s financial position was like ‘trying to cover ten tea-pots with nine lids’. Investigations revealed that the finance company offering the many sizeable loans to Carrian was Bumiputra Malaysia Finance Limited (BMFL), a deposit-taking company set up in Hong Kong by Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad (BBMB). To facilitate the acquisition of Gammon House, BMFL alone held out a staggering US$292 million credit to a new ‘two-dollar’ company solely controlled by the Carrian chairman. Such a huge loan arrangement was as unprecedented as it was extraordinary.
Changes of Carrian share prices
Date | Share Price (HK$) | Relevant events | |
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1979 | 3 Dec | 1.50 | A Carrian subsidiary acquires 52% share of listed company Mai Hon Enterprises Ltd. (Mai Hon) at HK$6 per share. |
31 Dec | 5.60 | The Mai Hon share price quadruples in less than a month. | |
1980 | 10 Jan | 5.90 | A Carrian subsidiary signs an agreement to acquire Gammon House. |
14 Aug | 11.20 | Carrian announces the issue of bonus shares – three for every five shares. | |
1 Sept | 13.70 | Mai Hon is renamed Carrian Investments Limited (CIL). | |
8 Sept | 14.80 | CIL is officially traded under the Carrian ‘label’ on the Stock Exchange. | |
3 Nov | 17.30 | Carrian announces a dividend of HK$0.30 per share and a two-for-five bonus issue. | |
5 Nov | 17.90 | Carrian stock price peaks. | |
26 Nov | 11.30 | Carrian issues 4.5 million new shares at HK$14.3 each. | |
1981 | 19 May | 8.80 | Carrian announces its profits for 1980. |
1982 | 26 Mar | 3.975 | Carrian announces its profits for 1981. |
16 Sept | 2.55 | Carrian announces its profits for the first six months of 1982 and pays an interim dividend of HK$0.12 per share. | |
26 Oct | 1.07 | Carrian announces cash-flow problem. | |
2 Dec | 0.63 | Carrian share price falls to its all-time low. | |
1983 | 3 Jan | – | Trading in Carrian shares suspended. |
Note: Neither Mai Hon nor Carrian was a constituent stock of the Hang Seng Index(HSI). Their price variations therefore had no influence on the movement of the HSI.
The Carrian and Bumiputra affair
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad (BBMB) was originally set up by the Malaysian government to provide banking services and professional business advice to Malaysian farmers of various ethnic groups. Soon it extended its business to overseas markets. Banking regulations in Hong Kong, however, did not permit BBMB to set up a branch in the territory. BBMB therefore set up a subsidiary company, Bumiputra Malaysia Finance Limited (BMFL), which was to be managed and operated in Hong Kong by several of its senior executives.
As a new lending house, BMFL had to be aggressive in building up a strong clientele. Carrian meanwhile badly needed money to finance its many business expansion programmes. The two companies were a perfect fit. In mid-1979, BMFL released its first HK$5 million loan to Carrian. The Carrian chairman initially dealt only with the general manager of BMFL, but contacts were later established with other BMFL senior executives including its chairman, director and alternate director.
As revealed in ICAC investigations, although the credits Carrian obtained from BMFL were all substantial, most were approved without adequate guarantees or supporting documentation, nor was there evidence to suggest that the loans had been subjected to the prescribed credit procedures.
Dissecting the Scam
As early as 1982, BBMB headquarters was suspicious about its Hong Kong subsidiary’s credit-approval procedures. The bank therefore dispatched an internal auditor from its Kuala Lumpur headquarters to act as assistant general manager supervising BMFL accounting and credit matters, and with an unspoken task to examine BMFL’s books from the inside. At the same time, BBMB also issued an order to BMFL halting any further loans to the Carrian Group of companies without prior headquarters’ approval.
On 18 July 1983, the internal auditor was reported missing. Two days later he was found dead inside a banana grove in Tai Po, New Territories. The then Organised and Serious Crime Bureau (OSCB) of the Hong Kong Police Force was tasked with investigating the case.
As the police investigations progressed, the ‘mysterious’ finance company behind all Carrian deals was finally brought to light. But what was it that motivated BMFL to grant Carrian huge credits one after another? How many problem loans had already been released prior to BBMB headquarters becoming suspicious and taking action to curb BMFL’s credit-approval authority? Had those loans ever been repaid? Who was involved? These were all questions to which BBMB urgently wanted answers.
One morning in July 1983, police officers from the Organised and Serious Crimes Bureau (OSCB) gathered in a banana grove in Tai Po to investigate suspected murder.
The dead body was that of a male. Tied around the body’s neck was a waist belt from a bathrobe. No identification document was found on the body. After a careful search, a Malaysian coin was found inside the pocket of his pants. A check of the Missing Persons Report revealed that the assistant general manager of BMFL had earlier reported that one of his colleagues from Malaysia responsible for credit matters was missing. It was later confirmed that the identity of the dead body matched the Missing Persons Report.
According to information provided by the complainant, the ‘missing’ person was supposed to meet the Carrian chairman on the afternoon of 18 July 1983 to sign a US$4 million loan agreement. However, the ‘missing’ man did not show up, although he did call the complainant twice to say that he was busy with something else. It turned out that the chairman of BMFL had arrived in Hong Kong from Malaysia that same day and had instructed the complainant to approve the loan without delay. Since the complainant had never had any authority to approve loans, he hesitated to follow the instruction. However, when the ‘missing’ Malaysian colleague called the second time, he was heard to merely utter the words “Wait, wait!” Then the line went dead and from that point on the man just vanished. Because of this extraordinary incident, coupled with repeated pressure from the BMFL chairman, the complainant felt he had no choice but to release the loan to the Carrian chairman. After the phone call, the complainant heard nothing further about his ‘missing’ Malaysian colleague until the body was found.
The deceased was the internal auditor of BBMB in Malaysia. He was seconded from the bank’s headquarters in Kuala Lumpur in 1982 to take up the post of assistant general manager overseeing BMFL’s accounting and credits services in Hong Kong. In fact, the bank’s headquarters had long suspected that BMFL had deviated from the established procedures when approving loans in Hong Kong. The Bank therefore sent over an auditor for a secret investigation, only to see him vanish in a foreign country.
The police investigated on the basis of witness statements and the circumstantial evidence found at the crime scene. A Malaysian man was identified as the prime suspect and was promptly arrested. Hotel staff confirmed that the suspect had a meeting with the deceased in the hotel on the day of the crime. At dawn, the suspect sought help from hotel staff to move a heavy piece of leather luggage into a taxi. The taxi-driver said that he also helped the suspect move the luggage, weighing possibly in excess of 100 pounds, into another hire-car. It was later confirmed that the suspect had hired a car that same day, and when the car was returned the wheels were covered with mud. The bathrobe belt tied around the deceased’s neck was found to be hotel property.
The murder case was detected in no time and the murderer jailed. But the true motive behind the murder remains a mystery to this day.
The Noordin Committee
The death of the internal auditor suggested that serious irregularities had occurred in the loan arrangements between BMFL and the Carrian Group. In January 1984, the Malaysian government set up a three-man committee of enquiry, consisting of the country’s Auditor-General, Mr Noordin, an accountant and a lawyer, to conduct a thorough investigation. The Noordin Committee spent several months interviewing BBMB staff and going through all the loan-related papers including the valuation report on Gammon House. The Committee was astonished to find that, from 1979 to 1983, BMFL had released a total of US$800 million (equivalent to HK$6 billion) in loans to the Carrian Group and to other companies controlled by the Carrian chairman. But the most staggering revelation was that most of these loans were approved without adequate security collateral or guarantees, and some were even released before assessment procedures had been completed. The Committee came to the conclusion that it was highly probable that senior executives of BMFL, including the chairman, the director and the alternate director, had accepted advantages from the Carrian chairman as rewards for approving the loans. However, by the end of October 1983, all three of these senior executives had resigned from BBMB and had fled Malaysia.
Since the alleged bribery took place in Hong Kong, it was considered proper for a Hong Kong law enforcement agency to investigate the matter. In April 1985, the Noordin Committee sent a representative to Hong Kong, with the assistance of the then Legal Department, to lodge a formal corruption complaint with the ICAC.
The BMFL scandal prompted the Malaysian government to set up the Noordin Committee to investigate the matter. After revealing that the scandal involved corruption and fraud, the government sent a Committee member to Hong Kong to lodge a corruption complaint. In April 1985, the Noordin Committee member arrived in Hong Kong to file a complaint.Since most of the loans released involved corruption, the then Legal Department decided that the ICAC should handle the case.
ICAC Investigation
On receiving the corruption complaint from the Noordin Committee, the ICAC realised that the investigation would be labourous and its scope was extensive due to its seriousness and complexity. A special Task Force was established to deal with the case. Nevertheless, no one would have predicted that, before it was completed in 2001, the case was to last 17 years – the longest ever handled by the ICAC.
Task Force 3 (TF3)
On 23 May 1985, the then Principal Investigator Anthony Robey was appointed Head of Task Force 3 (TF3), leading the first batch of 12 investigators on the Carrian case. Ricky Chu Man-kin, then a senior investigator, was among this group of TF3 officers.
Although Chu considered himself strong in mathematics, he made a ‘mistake’ in estimating the length of the case since what was thought to be a one-year case dragged on for more than ten years. He recounted quite dramatic the way he was ‘recruited’ into TF3: “In 1985, I was to be posted from the investigation branch to the ICAC Training School, serving as a training officer for new recruits when one day, I bumped into one of our assistant directors……”